Shield Finance Pre-Launch Security Checklist
Overview
Comprehensive security checklist for Shield Finance fair launch on Flare Network mainnet. This checklist must be completed before deploying to production.
Status: 🟢 527 Tests Passing | ✅ Security Audit Complete Last Security Review: December 6, 2025 Security Audit Status: All HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW findings resolved Target Launch Date: TBD
Note: Test counts include token launch contracts, vault system contracts, and security/adversarial test suites. December 2025 added comprehensive vault coverage.
1. Smart Contract Security
1.1 Code Audit
1.2 Test Coverage (527 Total)
1.3 Contract Verification
1.4 Access Control
1.5 Security Audit Findings (Resolved)
All security audit findings have been addressed as of November 28, 2025.
HIGH Severity
Centralized FXRP Reward Control
Owner could potentially drain FXRP rewards via recoverTokens() before stakers claimed
✅ FIXED: Implemented totalUnclaimedRewards tracking at distribution time. recoverTokens() now only allows recovery of excess FXRP beyond (totalUnclaimedRewards + pendingOrphanedRewards). Owner cannot withdraw freshly distributed rewards.
MEDIUM Severity
Fee-on-Transfer Token Vulnerability
Contract did not account for tokens that take fees on transfer, leading to accounting errors
✅ FIXED: Added balance comparison checks in stake() and distributeBoost(). If received amount differs from expected, transaction reverts with "Fee-on-transfer tokens not supported".
LOW Severity
Missing Reentrancy Protection
recoverTokens() lacked nonReentrant modifier
✅ FIXED: Added nonReentrant modifier to recoverTokens() function.
Unsafe Approval Pattern
Using raw approve() which fails for USDT-like tokens
✅ FIXED: Replaced with SafeERC20 forceApprove() pattern with reset to 0 after use.
Zero-Address Validation
Constructor did not validate revenueRouter address
✅ FIXED: Added require(_revenueRouter != address(0)) validation in constructor.
Orphaned FXRP Loss
If FXRP distributed when totalStaked == 0, rewards were lost
✅ FIXED: Implemented pendingOrphanedRewards bucket. Orphaned rewards are stored and distributed when staking resumes.
Technical Implementation Details
Protected FXRP Recovery System:
This ensures:
Owner can only recover truly excess FXRP (rounding dust or accidentally sent tokens)
Immediately after
distributeBoost(),totalUnclaimedRewardsis already incrementedStaker rewards are protected even before they interact with the contract
1.6 Ownership Transfer Plan
2. Deployment Security
2.1 Deployment Environment
2.2 Deployment Sequence
2.3 Post-Deployment Verification
Token Distribution:
Team: 900K SHIELD (9%) ✓
Advisors: 500K SHIELD (5%) ✓
Ecosystem Development: 1.5M SHIELD (15%) ✓
Airdrops: 2M SHIELD (20%) ✓
Marketing: 350K SHIELD (3.5%) ✓
Ambassadors: 250K SHIELD (2.5%) ✓
Treasury: 1M SHIELD (10%) ✓
Liquidity / MM / Exchanges: 1M SHIELD (10%) ✓
Future Liquidity Adds: 2.5M SHIELD (25%) ✓
Total: 10M SHIELD ✓
Block Explorer Verification:
All contracts verified on Flare Explorer
Constructor arguments correct
Source code matches deployed bytecode
Functional Testing:
Test airdrop claim (1 address minimum)
Test stake on StakingBoost
Test distribute() on RevenueRouter (with wFLR)
Verify all functions work as expected
3. Operational Security
3.1 Revenue Router Security
Weekly Burn Automation:
GitHub Actions workflow configured
Runs every Sunday at 00:00 UTC
Private key stored in GitHub Secrets
Workflow uses minimal permissions
No sensitive data logged (addresses, tx hashes, balances)
Manual Burn Process:
Backup process documented if automation fails
Owner can manually call distribute()
Minimum balance threshold: 5000 wFLR
Reserve Withdrawal:
Only owner can withdraw reserves
Multi-sig recommended for large withdrawals
Withdrawal events monitored on-chain
3.2 Airdrop Security
Merkle Tree Generation:
Tree generated from verified allocation list
No duplicate addresses
Total allocation = 2M SHIELD exactly
Proofs generated and tested
Tree saved securely (off-chain backup)
Claim Process:
Frontend validates proofs before submission
Users can generate proofs independently
No centralized claim approval required
Unclaimed Tokens:
Owner can withdraw unclaimed after 3-6 months
Withdrawal plan documented
Community notified before withdrawal
3.3 Monitoring & Alerts
On-Chain Monitoring:
Block explorer alerts for all contracts
Price feed monitoring (CoinGecko/CoinMarketCap)
Liquidity pool monitoring (SparkDEX analytics)
Revenue accumulation tracking
Security Monitoring:
Large transfers monitored (>100k SHIELD)
Unusual contract interactions flagged
Owner function calls logged and reviewed
Community Monitoring:
Discord/Telegram alerts for community questions
Bug bounty program active
Emergency contact info published
4. Economic Security
4.1 Fair Launch Economics (TBC - Launch Pending)
Initial Price:
Target: $0.01 per SHIELD (TBC)
LP Ratio: 535,451 wFLR / 1M SHIELD ≈ 0.535 wFLR per SHIELD (TBC)
Total Liquidity: ~$10,000 (TBC)
Supply Distribution:
Team allocation: 9% (with vesting recommended)
Treasury allocations transparent on-chain
Airdrop vested via merkle distributor (no unlock)
LP locked for 12 months (TBC)
Revenue Distribution Mechanics:
50% of revenue → SHIELD buyback/burn (deflationary) ✓
40% of revenue → StakingBoost rewards (FXRP to stakers) ✓
10% of revenue → Protocol reserves (sustainability) ✓
Distribution triggered via RevenueRouter.distribute()
Burn events public on-chain
4.2 Liquidity Security (TBC - Launch Pending)
LP Lock:
12-month lock via Team Finance (TBC)
Lock duration: 31,536,000 seconds (365 days)
Lock receipt publicly verifiable
Unlock date communicated to community
Initial Liquidity:
Sufficient depth for initial trading (~$10k) (TBC)
Wide price range (±100%) for stability
0.3% fee tier (standard for most pairs)
Anti-Rug Measures:
No team tokens unlocked at launch
No mint function (supply fixed)
LP locked (cannot be removed) (TBC)
Ownership renounced or multisig (optional)
4.3 Market Risk Mitigation
Price Oracle:
SparkDEX V3 pool is source of truth
RevenueRouter uses
amountOutMinimum: 0(⚠️ MEV risk)TODO: Consider price oracle integration (Chainlink/Flare FTSO)
Slippage Protection:
Wide LP range reduces slippage
Large trades may still experience slippage
Users should use limit orders when possible
Liquidity Depth:
$10k initial liquidity may not support large trades (TBC)
Community encouraged to add liquidity over time
Protocol revenue increases liquidity via buy pressure
5. Communication & Transparency
5.1 Pre-Launch Communication
Documentation:
Deployment guide published (SHIELD_DEPLOYMENT.md) ✅
Security checklist published (this document) ✅
User guides published (How to claim, stake, etc.)
FAQ document prepared
Code Transparency:
GitHub repository public
All contracts open source
Test suite public (527 tests documented)
Deployment scripts public
Community Engagement:
Discord/Telegram community established
Social media accounts verified
Launch announcement drafted
AMA scheduled (optional)
5.2 Launch Communication
Launch Announcement:
Contract addresses published
Block explorer links shared
LP lock proof shared
Merkle tree published (for claims)
User Instructions:
How to add SHIELD to wallet (contract address)
How to claim airdrop (proof generation)
How to stake (StakingBoost UI)
How to trade (SparkDEX link)
Security Warnings:
Only official contract addresses
Beware of scam tokens
Verify contract on block explorer
No official DMs or support via DM
5.3 Post-Launch Monitoring
Community Support:
Support channels monitored 24/7 (first week)
Bug reports triaged and responded to
Questions answered promptly
Incident Response:
Emergency contact info published
Security incident response plan prepared
Contract pause mechanism (if applicable)
Community notification plan for incidents
6. Legal & Compliance
6.1 Legal Review
Regulatory Compliance:
Legal counsel consulted (if applicable)
Securities laws reviewed (fair launch model)
No securities offering (tokens distributed fairly)
Terms of service prepared
Disclaimers:
No investment advice disclaimers
Smart contract risk disclaimers
Loss of funds warnings
Experimental software warnings
Intellectual Property:
Open source license chosen (MIT recommended)
License included in repository
No trademark/copyright violations
6.2 Geographic Restrictions
Restricted Jurisdictions:
No specific geographic restrictions (decentralized)
Users responsible for local compliance
Disclaimer: "Not available in prohibited jurisdictions"
KYC/AML:
No KYC required (permissionless protocol)
No central entity controlling funds
On-chain transparency only
7. Emergency Procedures
7.1 Critical Vulnerabilities
Vulnerability Response Plan:
Security contact email published ([email protected])
Bug bounty program active (Immunefi recommended)
Vulnerability disclosure policy published
Emergency multisig prepared (if applicable)
Contract Pause Mechanism:
NOTE: Shield Finance contracts are NOT pausable (by design)
No emergency pause function (cannot stop trades/claims/burns)
Immutable contracts = trustless but cannot be paused
Mitigation Strategies:
If critical bug found: Deploy fixed contracts, migrate liquidity
If RevenueRouter bug: Deploy new router, update revenue source
If MerkleDistributor bug: Deploy new distributor, re-fund airdrop
All mitigation plans require community communication
7.2 Incident Response
Communication Plan:
Discord/Telegram emergency announcements
Twitter/X emergency thread
Block explorer warning (if possible)
Email subscribers (if newsletter exists)
Technical Response:
Smart contract experts on call
Auditor contact info ready
Blockchain forensics team identified (if needed)
Emergency fund for remediation (if needed)
8. Final Pre-Launch Checklist
Critical Items (Must Complete)
All 527 tests passing
External audit completed and published (November 28, 2025)
Testnet deployment successful
Deployer wallet funded (5 FLR)
Merkle tree generated and verified
SparkDEX addresses verified
Team Finance locker tested
Emergency procedures documented
Community communication ready
Block explorer verification prepared
Recommended Items (Highly Recommended)
Bug bounty program launched (Immunefi)
Mainnet fork testing completed
Ownership transferred to multisig
Price oracle integration (for RevenueRouter)
Community review period (1-2 weeks)
Marketing materials prepared
DEX listings prepared (CoinGecko, CMC)
Analytics dashboard prepared
Optional Items (Nice to Have)
Branded UI for claiming/staking
Mobile app integration
Third-party integrations (wallets, aggregators)
Partnerships announced
Influencer outreach
Press release drafted
Sign-Off
Deployment Approved By:
__________
Lead Developer
__________
______
__________
Security Auditor
__________
______
__________
Project Manager
__________
______
__________
Legal Counsel
__________
______
Deployment Date: _______________ Network: Flare Mainnet (Chain ID: 14) Version: 1.0.0
Appendix: Security Resources
Audit Firms
CertiK: https://www.certik.com
Trail of Bits: https://www.trailofbits.com
OpenZeppelin: https://openzeppelin.com/security-audits
Quantstamp: https://quantstamp.com
Consensys Diligence: https://consensys.net/diligence
Bug Bounty Platforms
Immunefi: https://immunefi.com
Code4rena: https://code4rena.com
HackerOne: https://www.hackerone.com
Security Tools
Slither: https://github.com/crytic/slither
Mythril: https://github.com/ConsenSys/mythril
Echidna: https://github.com/crytic/echidna
Manticore: https://github.com/trailofbits/manticore
Flare Resources
Flare Docs: https://docs.flare.network
Flare Explorer: https://flare-explorer.flare.network
SparkDEX Docs: https://docs.sparkdex.ai
Team Finance: https://www.team.finance
Security Checklist Version: 1.1.0 Last Updated: November 28, 2025 Audit Status: ✅ All Findings Resolved Status: ✅ Ready for Deployment
Last updated